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Abstract 
Theory testing within small-N research designs is generally considered problematic. 
Developments in the philosophy of social science have opened up new methodological 
possibilities through, among other things, a novel notion of contingent causality that allows for 
contextualized hypothesis generation, hypothesis testing and refinement, and generalization. 
This article looks to contribute to the literature by providing an example of critical realist (one 
such new development in the philosophy of social science) research on a small-N comparative 
case study that includes hypothesis testing. The article begins with the key ontological 
assumptions of critical realism and its relation to theory and explanation. Then, the paper 
presents an illustrative example of an e-government and trust comparative case study 
following these ontological assumptions. Given word length limitations, the focus of the 
example is on the nature and process of theory and hypothesis development, rather than the 
actually testing that occurred. Essential to developing testable hypotheses is the generation of 
tightly linked middle-range and case-specific theories that provide propositions that can be 
tested and refined. The link provides a pathway to feedback the concrete empirical data to the 
higher level (more abstract) and generalizable middle-range theories. 
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1. Introduction 
Theory-testing in small-N studies is generally considered problematic. Small-N studies refer to 
studies with a small number of observations where the goal is not to represent a relevant 
population, but rather is to conduct a more intensive study of a small number of phenomena 
(Gerring, 2007). From the positivist perspective, the small number of observations means that 
it is difficult to attain statistical significance. Consequently, researchers, especially qualitative 
researchers, have been advised in the past to increase the size of N as the best way to “enhance 
the inferential leverage of empirical tests” (Collier, Seawright, & Munch, 2004, p. 27). From 
the interpretivist epistemological perspective, research is not thought to be subject to the same 
evaluation criteria as positivist work (Klein & Myers, 1999; Weber, 2004) as the goal of 
research is to understand, not to discover (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, p. 14) or test 
(Avgerou, Ciborra, & Land, 2004).  
 
Consequently, a common occurrence in research is the use of post-hoc justification rather than 
theory-testing.1 The inability to test theory means that the act of research takes on less 
importance than does justifying the results post-hoc (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 
2002). In such a situation, validity is no longer related to verification, but rather becomes a 
game of persuasion (Astley, 1985; Meckler & Baillie, 2003, p. 279). This situation places a 
strain on the validity of findings because there is so much flexibility the results in the 
confirmation an a priori stance that any interpretation can be found to fit the facts (Merton, 
1967, p. 148). 
 
There is a third perspective, underpinned by new developments in the philosophy of social 
science, which arguably provides for the possibility for a qualified theory-testing in small-N 
studies. Critical realism is a relatively new philosophy of the natural and social sciences 
developed in the late 70s and early eighties (Bhaskar, 1978, 1998b). Since then it has provided 
the basis for a range of social science research (Carter & New, 2004; Danermark, Ekstrom, 
Jokobsen, & Karlsson, 2003; Mingers, 2000, 2004d; Pawson & Tilley, 1997). This article 
argues that one of the benefits of this philosophy is that it contributes a novel notion of 
contingent causality that allows for contextualized hypothesis generation and hypothesis 
testing and refinement.2 Furthermore, this approach allows for multi-level theorizing makes it 
possible for highly contextual empirical evidence to feedback to more abstract theories, a 
crucial step for generalization. 
 
In the information systems literature, the potential benefits of critical realism have been touted 
(P. J. Dobson, 2002; Houston, 2001; Mingers, 2004a, 2004c, 2004d; Smith, 2006). However, 
there are few discussions of the influence of critical realist theorizing in information systems 
literature that move beyond stating that it allows for a broadly realist ontological position and 
supports multimethodology (e.g., Mingers, 2004c, 2004d). Furthermore, there are few 
examples of critical realism actively applied in research (P. Dobson, Myles, & Jackson, 2007; 
Morton, 2006). In particular, Dobson et al. argue that critical realism pushes for research that 
is tilted for theory confirmation or refutation. This article extends the Dobson et al. example to 
illustrate the role of theory, and in particular middle-range theory, in hypothesis formation and 
feedback to generalizable theory.  
 
This paper provides an example of critical realist hypothesis generation taken from an in-depth 
case study of e-services and trust in Chile. The research involved employing both quantitative 
and qualitative methods to assess and understand citizens’ interactions with and interpretations 
of the e-services in Chile. Even though the main method employed was the interview, the goal 
was not just understanding, but also explanation, hypothesis testing, and theory building.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, there is a consideration of the key ontological 
assumptions of critical realism and its relation to theory and explanation. Second, the paper 
                                                 
1 While such an approach is common for interpretivist studies it also occurs in positivist case study research 
(Dubé & Paré, 2003). 
2 It must be said that there are many other scientific realists who, while not explicitly critical realists, have come 
to almost the same conclusions on causality. For example, the philosophers Mario Bunge and Nancy Cartwright 
or methodologists like Shadish, Cook, and Campbell take similar positions on causality, as discussed below. 
presents an illustrative example of a comparative case study following a critical realist 
philosophy. In order to show how critical realist assumptions influenced the research process, 
the illustration delves into the reasoning behind the process of middle-range and case-specific 
theory and hypothesis generation, and the method of theory integration. Finally, the paper 
concludes.  
 
 
2. How does critical realism influence research? 
Mingers (2004b, 2004d) argues that critical realism “subsumes” positivism and interpretivism, 
effectively ending the paradigm wars. This statement can be understood when one views 
critical realism as an ontological project. The core of critical realism is a series of 
metaphysical ontological assumptions that emerged from an examination of scientific activity 
of what must be common to all things for research to be possible. It is through this new 
metaphysical framework that critical realism provides the common denominator upon which 
to integrate (and thereby subsume) research from within other research paradigms.  
 
Integrating research effectively equates to a process of reinterpreting research in light of these 
critical realist ontological assumptions (Befani, 2005; Fleetwood, 2001; Pratschke, 2003; Ron, 
2002). However, reinterpreting research ex post does not necessarily imply a change in the 
activity of research itself. Indeed, if we accept the critical realist position, then one might be 
tempted to argue that all research is by its very nature is critical realist without realizing it 
(Smith, 2006). If this is the case, then arguably critical realism does not appear to offer 
anything new to research practice, other than some new metaphysical concepts and jargon.  
 
The influence of critical realism is that it provides a systematic approach to thinking about the 
relationship between research object and practice. Critical realism works at the level of 
metaphysics, and thus does not comment directly on the content of scientific level concepts or 
on what research strategies or methods to use (Bhaskar, 1978; Lawson, 2004; Martins, 2006). 
Rather, these assumptions provide a framework that underwrites causal-explanatory research 
and an emphasis on causal theory (Danermark et al., 2003, pp. 108-112). In other words, the 
ontological assumptions of critical realism have implications that pervade through to the 
practice of research, and, in particular, the relationship between theory and practice.  
 
The central ontological assumption that influences research is the metaphysical and non-
deterministic notion of the generative mechanism (Bhaskar, 2002; Groff, 2004, p. 138; Sayer, 
2000). This notion is based upon a stratified reality that is broken up into three ontological 
domains: the real, actual, and empirical (Bhaskar, 1978, p. 13). The real consists of the “realm 
of objects, their structures and powers” (Kazi, 2003, p. 23). A structure consists of a set of 
relations that is held together by bonds of some sort (Bunge, 2004, p. 188). Emerging from 
these relations are the particular capacities to behave (causal powers) that are “nothing other 
than the way of acting of a thing” (Bhaskar, 1998a, p. 38). Thus, the internal relations that 
constitute the structure of a thing give it both its qualitative properties as well as its causal 
powers.  
 
Causality and explanation are intimately related (Gregor, 2006, p. 618). Recently philosophers 
of science have begun to substitute talk about causality for scientific explanation (Cartwright, 
2004). This follows for those subscribing to critical realism. Explanation is the uncovering of 
the operation and interaction of the influential generative mechanisms that brought about any 
particular outcome of interest. What makes this notion of causality especially powerful for 
explanation is that its metaphysical status enables it to encompass a wide variety of actual 
causes. For example, beliefs and desires can be causal (Archer, 1995; Meckler & Baillie, 2003, 
p. 275). This allows for the researchers who are interested in understanding to engage in 
hypothesis testing and refinement. Indeed, this idea is not necessarily new to interpretive work. 
For example, a strong argument can be made that the hermeneutic circle engages in theory 
testing of different interpretations (Follesdal, 1994; Martin, 1994). Critical realism also allows 
for attributing causes to the structures of social entities, stemming from a relational perspective 
on sociology (Porpora, 1998), which makes possible the tracing of the interaction of structure 
and agency through time (Archer, 1995; Volkoff, Strong, & Elmes, 2007). 
 
This particular philosophical position creates a distinctive set of goals for theorization. First, 
one attempts to identify the distinctive core properties of the generative mechanism at work. 
These core properties are the essential components and their interrelationships from which the 
causal tendency emerges. Thus, a causal theory of a generative mechanism includes both the 
structural components and the outcome tendency. In this way, it is also possible to think about 
it in terms of a causal process. Central to this endeavor is that this is an ideal typical 
abstraction which means that a) it separates the necessary causally efficacious features from 
the nonessential ones (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002, p. 9), and b) the actual 
manifestations of these theories in the world will always diverge by some degree from the 
ideal. 
 
Explanation, however, can move beyond simply revealing causal powers – it should also 
include in what circumstances they are active (Fay, 1994, p. 95). If this is the case, then 
explanation requires a contextual notion of causality. A deeper understanding of generative 
mechanisms includes the three components found in the formulation “x causes y (in 
circumstances c)” (Cartwright, 2003). Thus, explanation includes the structure that underlies 
the generative mechanisms (structure of X), the outcome that these mechanisms tend to 
produce (Y), and finally the elements of context that trigger or inhibit the firing of these 
generative mechanisms (C). Any explanation must include all three of these elements. The end 
result is that we are interested in, to paraphrase Carlsson (2003) and Pawson & Tilley (1997, p. 
210), how, for whom, and in what circumstances particular mechanisms generate particular 
outcomes. 
 
 
3. A critical realist comparative case study 
A comparative case study of the impacts of e-government on trust in Chile was conducted 
applying these critical realist ontological assumptions. This study began with a relatively 
simple assumption and research question. The assumption is that there is a causal link between 
e-government services and citizens’ trust in government institutions. The research question 
explores that link: how, for whom, and in what circumstances do e-services impact on citizens’ 
trust in government? Another way of framing the question is: what are the generative 
mechanisms that connect e-services to changes in citizens’ trust perceptions of government? 
  
The goal of presenting this case study is to demonstrate how middle-range and case-specific 
hypotheses can be used to develop testable contextualized theory. This testable theory was 
consequently employed in case study work with a concern for “understanding” citizens’ 
interpretations of their interactions with the e-services in terms of trust in the government. 
Given space constraints, the presentation is limited to the process of theory generation.3  
 
The following discussion presents a picture of theorization that appears as if it were completed 
before the first foray into the field began. The reality is, of course, more complex. However, 
for considerations of space and simplicity, it is presented in linear order. Theorization as 
performed for this research was done in layers, from abstract ideal-typical theories to concrete. 
There are two main levels of theory: middle-range theories and case-specific testable 
hypotheses.  
 
 
3.1 Developing middle-range hypotheses 
Building up the conceptual framework for e-government and trust requires three levels of 
theory integration where each level provides the structure upon which the subsequent level is 
constructed (see Figure 1). The first layer establishes a core theory of trust. This phase of the 
study identified several components of trust that were arguably essential for the concept: a 
distinction between trust and trustworthiness, the two dimensions of trustworthiness of 
motivation and competence, the notion of trustworthiness cues that communicate these 
dimensions, and finally that placing trust requires a cognitive and emotional component for the 
truster. The conceptualization directs the researcher to understand the components of 
institutional trust interaction: a) the objective characteristics of institutional trustworthiness, b) 
how trustworthy cues emanating from these characteristics are communicated through action 
(or non-action), and c) the perception and interpretation of these characteristics. 
 
Building upon this trust foundation, the second level integrates political science theories of 
trust in government, and specifically, institutional trust. This level provides the framework of 
how this research will approach the question of what it means to trust in government 
(institutional trust), and if such trust is even possible. The third level is broken up into two 
parts. The first part provides a theoretical understanding of the dynamics of ICT in the public 
sector providing insight into the types of changes that can be expected with the introduction of 
e-government. Here is where the technological artifact enters into the causal equation. The 
second part of level three then integrates all of the theory and draws from empirical work to 
form the final sets of testable hypotheses that connect e-government to institutional trust.  
 
The end result of this process in this study is a series of fifteen ideal-typical middle-range 
theories (see Table 1). Middle-range theories fall between high-level non-testable theory and 
concrete descriptions (Merton, 1967). These are theories that are close enough to the empirical 
world to be tested and refined. As we will see, they provide the link between the concrete 
                                                 
3 For those interested in the details of the full study, see Smith (2007). 
findings of any particular research, and the middle-level theory upon which generalization is 
based. For critical realists, it is working at this level of theory where theory building can 
happen in a cumulative and more rigorous way (Danermark et al., 2003; Pawson & Tilley, 
1997). 
 
 
Figure 1: Levels of theory. The starting point for building theory is the general understandings of trust from 
sociology and psychology. This is followed by theories of institutional trust, generally drawn from political 
science. The final layer includes theories of building institutional trust through e-government, a very specific 
instantiation of institutional trust. The final stage of theory requires a detailed understanding of the interaction of 
ICT in the public sector. This is a movement from a core theory of trust to a specific instance of trust. 
 
A quick note helps to explain the nature of the resultant hypotheses. The institutional trust 
theories provide a general perspective of the different ways we would expect the structure and 
activities of institutions to communicate trust to citizens that is theorized to build trust. This 
general theory is then decomposed into a variety of causal mechanism hypotheses that may or 
may not be active for any one e-service. Ideally, this decomposition also includes the 
relationship between these components that show how they interact to generate particular 
institutional trust outcomes. For example, good governmental performance has been linked to 
positive trust responses in survey work (Espinal, Hartlyn, & Kelley, 2006; Miller & Listhaug, 
1999). Each individual component is then made more contextually applicable through a 
consideration of how the particular e-service (although still generally speaking) might impact 
institutional trust along the already identified dimensions. This requires the integration of 
institutional trust theory and an understanding of the interaction of ICT in the public sector. 
The ICT in the public sector theory provides the more specific hypothetical outcomes that fit 
within the more general institutional trust theory. Extending the performance example, we can 
then hypothesize that a more efficient service vis-à-vis computer automation is a specific 
example of institutional performance that will tend to build trust. It is important to note that 
given the relational nature of trust that these hypotheses are always relative to the truster. For 
example, good performance must be perceived by the truster in order for it to build trust. 
Institutional trust theory Examples of “Building institutional trust  
through E-services” hypotheses 
COMPETENCE 
 
Good institutional performance 
that can be communicated, 
understood, and that is perceived 
to meet or exceed citizens’ 
expectations of performance tends 
to build trust. 
Efficiency/effectiveness 
E-services perceived to be more effective and efficient (faster, 
more accurate, cost savings) tend to build trust. 
 
E-government services that improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of service at the institution’s physical office tend to 
build trust. 
 
Performance transparency 
Performance transparency that meets citizens’ expectations tends 
to build trust. 
MOTIVATION 
 
If the institution’s policies 
encompass the interests of the 
citizen, trust tends to be built.  
 
(1) Mechanisms that work to 
align (such as voice and 
exit) the interests of the 
institution and citizen tend 
to build trust. 
 
(2) Establishing credible 
institutional commitments 
through credible and 
effective institutional 
checks and balances that 
keep the public sector’s 
interests in line with 
citizens’ interests tends to 
build trust.  
Considering users interests 
User benefits: E-services that bring user benefits tend to increase 
trust. 
E-service quality: Good e-services quality indicates that the 
institution considers citizens’ interests and therefore tends to build 
trust. 
 
Transparency and accountability 
Institutional transparency and accountability: Increased 
transparency made possible through the increased visibility of 
internal processes and service outcomes accompanied by 
perceived effective accountability mechanisms tend to build trust. 
 
Corruption 
Reduced corruption: A reduction of corruption due to the 
computerization and rationalization of government processes tends 
to build trust. 
Table 1: Examples of the ideal-type, middle-range hypotheses developed from the theory. Only seven of the 15 
testable middle-range hypotheses that were developed and tested are shown here. 
 
3.2 Integrating theory: not one but many middle-range theories 
The theorization so far was made following the assumption that (at least a priori) there is no 
single theory that will be sufficient to explain what may be happening in Chile with citizens, e-
government services, and trust. Perhaps after engaging in research one theory will provide 
sufficient explanatory power through identification of a big-effect; that is, a large causal 
influence that overrides most of the other contextual causal mechanisms. Beforehand, 
however, it was not possible to know what the most influential causes might be. This means 
that theory was drawn from relevant sources that provide insight into the potential causal 
activities in particular aspects of the research object domain. For example, theories of ICT in 
public sector administration are helpful to understand how these implementations might alter 
the trustworthiness of the public sector institutions. However, these social-psychological or 
psychological theories are helpful when trying to understand citizens’ interpretations and 
resulting trust judgments of their interaction with the e-services. Furthermore, they need to be 
linked with the political theory that leads to an understanding of democracy and how citizens’ 
form judgments about the state. This integration of theory from across disciplines is made 
possible by working at the middle-range level and viewing each theory as contributing 
interesting causal components (George & Bennett, 2005).  
 
The benefit of a focus on causality for theoretical integration is easily seen when considering 
trust theory. There is a vast literature on trust from a variety of disciplines that says a lot about 
the types of causal mechanisms that might connect e-services to citizens’ perceptions, 
including theory from political science, sociology, psychology, information systems, and 
public administration. The research here exploits the current state of knowledge as a 
theoretical starting point and a means to generate an initial set of research orienting theories 
(for an overview of the objective of the research, areas of discipline, and theory used in this 
research, see Table 2). Integration is made possible through a reinterpretation of individual 
theories as generative mechanisms. For example, one area of contention in the trust literature 
is whether or not trust should be seen as a fundamentally rational concept, or one that is moral 
in nature. From the critical realist perspective, these conceptions are not competing. Rather, 
they represent theories that point to different causal components that may lead to trustworthy 
behavior (it is in my interest to do so and I think it is the honorable thing to do) and to trusting 
behavior (I think she will do it because it is in her interest and I think she is a virtuous person). 
If this is the case, the question becomes when and why these different motivators come into 
play. This approach is deeply rooted in the notion of a non-deterministic causality that always 
provides only a partial explanation as other co-active mechanisms are always active in a 
particular context. Not surprisingly, this meta-theoretical perspective emerges in other theory. 
For example, the Theory of Multiple Contingencies that “recognizes work unit design as being 
simultaneously influenced by numerous contingency forces, whose effects might complement 
or counteract one another” (Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999, p. 268). Rather than a specific 
theory, so stated, the Theory of Multiple Contingencies can be interpreted as a metatheoretical 
position on causality that can be seen as roughly equivalent to the critical realist position. 
 
3.3 Case-specific hypotheses 
The final stage of hypothesis generation is the development of case-specific testable 
hypotheses (see Table 3). This development of hypotheses is the last movement from abstract 
to concrete and always requires some knowledge of the actual case site. The specificity of the 
theory is analytically crucial as it allows the location of variation across cases. For example, 
consider a statistical analysis of survey results of people’s trust in government after interacting 
with e-government web-pages, a common approach to studying e-government and trust. Such 
a study smoothes over the variations of the independent variables: the differences between the 
web-pages and individuals. It is these variations that are included in the context specific 
theories. It is at this level that we really get at the core of explanation; that is, the how, for 
whom, and in what circumstances e-government services will build institutional trust. The 
specificity of the theories also allows them to be subjected to within-case empirical testing. 
 
Social object Description of research area Sources of theories 
Trust 
• What is trust? What does it consist of? 
What are the outcomes of trust? How is 
trust built/destroyed? 
 
• How do people interpret trustworthy 
cues, which cues do they pay attention 
to? How/why do people turn particular 
interpretations into trust judgments? 
Sociology 
Hardin, Sztompka, Seligman, 
Luhmann, Giddens, Gambetta 
 
 
Social-psychology, psychology 
Hardin, Braithwaite, Gambetta 
 
Trust in the state, 
institutional trust 
• What constitutes a trustworthy public 
sector?  
• What types of experiences are important 
for a trustworthy state? 
Political science   
M. Levi, Harding, Cook, Warren, 
Norris, Zucker 
E-government (ICT 
in public 
administration, 
bureaucracy) 
• Changes in public sector agency 
administration and services due to 
introduction of ICT 
Information systems, 
organizational theory, public 
administration 
Fountain, Kallinikos, Dunleavy, 
Heeks, Weber, Bhatnagar 
E-services and 
building trust in the 
state 
• How do e-services influence institutional 
trust? What factors influence the 
perception and use of e-services? 
Empirical work: Moon, West, 
Tolbert & Mossberger, Avgerou 
et al.  
Table 2: Social objects, research areas, and major theorists referred to in the development of the conceptual 
framework for thinking about the relationship between e-government and trust. 
 
The concern with variation is essential because the case specific hypotheses will necessarily 
vary from the ideal-typical theory of which it is an instantiation. Understanding this deviation 
is necessary for judging the validity of the test for any one hypothesis. In other words, if we 
are going to test, say, if institutional transparency builds trust, it is necessary to establish the 
quality of the transparency in the case; we must first sufficiently establish the antecedents to 
know if it is a true test of the higher-level theory.4 Knowing how the case specific instantiation 
varies from the ideal typical theory of transparency and trust building is crucial for making 
plausible inferences to deal with the inability to ever truly falsify theories. In other words, if 
transparency does not build trust in this specific case, is the higher level theory wrong or does 
the case deviate from the ideal-type theory? And how and why might the deviation alter the 
outcome? For example, imagine a web site that provides information of poor quality and 
timeliness. It would be a mistake to hypothesize that this web site would be trusted due to 
transparency. However, if it is found that the website does increase trust, if we can explain 
how and why we would have an interesting addition to the understanding of the relationship 
between web site transparency (information and quality) and trust. 
 
In this study, each theory was first tested on a within-case basis. Each subject (e-service user) 
was considered an individual test of each theory. Do they trust? Why? What is it about this 
person that makes them trust (transparency, efficiency, something else)? Given the partial 
                                                 
4 If we want to test or refine the theory “if A then B (in circumstances C)” we have to first establish A and C. 
explanatory nature of each theory, during the analysis a concern is always maintained with the 
potential interactions between the causal components of the theory.  After within case testing, 
theories were compared across cases, taking analytical advantage of the cases specific 
variations.  
 
 
 
 
 
Middle-range institutional  
trust and e-services hypotheses 
Case-specific e-tax  
trustworthiness-to-trust hypotheses 
Considering users interests 
I1 User benefits: E-services that bring user benefits will tend to increase trust. 
Increased user benefits in terms of time and cost 
savings for those who use the e-service will tend to 
build trust. 
I2 
E-service quality: Good e-service quality 
indicates that the institution considers 
citizens’ interests and therefore tends to 
build trust. 
High ease of use (completed tax proposal) and the 
usefulness of the e-service (a necessary obligation for 
taxpayers) indicates that the SII takes the citizen’s 
interests into account and will tend to build trust. 
Transparency and accountability 
I3 
Institutional transparency and 
accountability: Increased transparency of 
internal processes and service outcomes 
accompanied by perceived effective 
accountability mechanisms will tend to 
build trust. 
While the website presents the rules and regulations of 
tax processes as well as increases the transparency of 
the activities of the SII vis-à-vis the citizen, the lack 
of effective accountability mechanisms will tend to 
have no impact on trust. 
Corruption 
I4 
Reduced corruption: A perceived reduction 
of corruption due to the computerization 
and rationalization of government processes 
will tend to build trust. 
Moderately decreased opportunities for SII employee 
corruption through the computerization of many tax 
processes will tend to have a moderate impact on 
building trust. 
Table 3:  Some examples of case-specific hypotheses developed from the e-tax system run by the SII (the 
Chilean tax authority). Each case-specific hypothesis is a contextually specific manifestation of a middle-range 
theory developed earlier. 
 
It should be noted that, as it was employed in this study, case studies have the advantage 
especially in the exploratory stage of research to “allow one to test a multitude of hypotheses 
in a rough and ready way” (Gerring, 2007, p. 41). While such testing is potentially subject to 
errors of inference, if the focus is on the testing and refinement of the casual mechanisms and 
their contingent activation we have increased faith in their internal validity (Gerring, 2007; 
Tsoukas, 1989). The viability of a within-case analysis is enhanced by the use of within-case 
comparisons (George & Bennett, 2005), which in this case was between the e-service users. 
Finally, the use of the cross-case comparison adds extra analytical power to the testing and 
refinement of the theories (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
4. Conclusion 
The approach to theory development outlined in this paper provides some benefits. First, there 
is a tight link between different levels of theory. This provides a direct mechanism of feedback 
between the levels of theory allowing for the movement from case-specific empirical data to 
more generalizable statements. Thus, a within-case analysis can test and refine each of the 
different case-specific hypotheses separately. These refined theories can then provide feedback 
for the more abstract middle-range theories which are more portable than case-specific 
theories. The middle-range theories can be tested and refined in other research situations by 
creating other case-specific instantiations that correspond to the new empirical site. This 
allows for the flexible deployment of these theories in a variety of contexts, which also leads 
to the improved generalizability of these theories as they are made increasingly nuanced 
through the understanding of how they interact with different contextual mechanisms. 
 
Of course, theory building does not always have to be done prior to research. The research 
approach taken here was heavy on front-end theorizing and used research cycles and 
comparative analysis to generate case-specific theories and then test and refine them. 
However, it would be perfectly consistent with the critical realist approach to generate theory 
using a method such as grounded theory if it was appropriate for the given research goals and 
subject. For example, Volkoff et al. (2007) conducted a longitudinal study of technology and 
organizational change using grounded theory underpinned by critical realism. The key is that 
the emerging theory should be of the causal-explanatory type discussed above.  
 
All research has its problems as well. In particular, the approach proposed here is heavy on 
front-end theorizing and theory-integration. This requires extensive multi-disciplinary 
exposure. Undoubtedly, this adds significant richness to the theoretical propositions, and 
potential understanding when confronting the empirical site. It also helps to prevent social 
scientists from reinventing the wheel. However, there is a significant risk that a jack-of-all-
trades is really a master of none. Furthermore, the result of theorization for the case presented 
here was a very broad set of potential causes (reality is complex!) on which the author tried to 
gather data. The end result was breadth rather than depth, and plenty of time was spent on 
particular causes that in the end were not of any importance.  
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